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ARGUMENT 
Petitioner Larry N. Long ("Long'") submits this Reply to the Brief of Appellee / 
Respondent Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court (the 
"Committee"). Petitioner seeks review of and relief from an Order of Discipline: 
Admonition (OPC File No. 07-0497—"Shepard" matter), an Order of Discipline: Public 
Reprimand (OPC File No. 08-0049—"Nelson" matter), and an Order of Discipline: 
Public Reprimand (OPC File No. 08-0080—"Henroid" matter). 
I. The Screening Panel Was Required to Make More Detailed Findings of Fact 
in Support of Its Disciplinary Recommendations. 
Although the Committee appears to acknowledge that the Findings of Fact offered 
by the Screening Panel are deficient the Committee nevertheless claims these 
perfunctory findings are acceptable in the context of "low-level" matters dealt with in 
informal disciplinary proceedings. The Committee asserts that Long places a "false 
burden" on the Screening Panel by demanding detailed findings of fact and comparing 
the Screening Panel to a district court. See Brief of Appellee (hereinafter "Committee 
Brief), p. 18. In effect, the Committee takes issue with the requirements of Supreme 
Court Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7) (formerly 14-510(b)(5)(D) and (E)), 
which requires a screening panel to state the basis of its disciplinary recommendation. 
A. Contrary to the Committee's Assertion, This Court Has Not Held that 
Informal Disciplinary Proceedings Deserve Less Attention and Detail. 
In defending the Screening Panel's findings of fact in each matter, the Committee 
first argues that the Screening Panel was not required to issue detailed finings of fact 
because informal disciplinary proceedings require only nominal due process, and not the 
1 
675 :428614vl 
level of detail and precision sought by Long. The Committee asserts that this Court 
agreed with this position when it accepted the Petition to Amend the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability, In re State Bar, Feb. 25, 2002.] Citing In re Johnson, 2001 UT 
110, 48 P.3d 881, the Committee claims that "a closer level of scrutiny" is warranted only 
where an attorney may be subject to suspension or disbarment, and a screening panel's 
"relatively slight'* powers do not necessitate the "detail and precision" which may be 
required in more formal proceedings. See Committee Brief, pp. 19, 21. 
The Johnson case does not support the Committee's argument. Johnson says 
nothing of the level of scrutiny to be applied in attorney discipline cases. Contrary to the 
Committee's assertion, the Court does not imply that an attorney subject to suspension or 
disbarment is entitled to a closer level of scrutiny, greater evaluation of the facts, or a 
more exhaustive explanation of any negative decision. Rather, the Court merely holds, 
for the practical reasons stated, that it may be appropriate where disbarment is ordered to 
stay imposition of the sanction "[bjecause the private practice of law cannot easily be 
stopped and started again." Johnson, 2001 UT 110, <| 17. Chief Justice Durham explains 
in her concurring and dissenting opinion that "[t]here is little likelihood that a practice 
could be restored or regenerated if this court were to reverse the sanction after appeal." 
M a t H 22. 
1
 The Committee claims that by acceptance of the 2003 amendment to Rule 14-510, this 
Court "acknowledged that the due process provided by Rule 14-510 . . . was sufficient for 
the imposition of the lesser non-restrictive sanctions." See Committee Brief, p. 19. Long 
disputes this inference and submits that the 2009 amendment to Rule 14-510 following 
the Nemelka decision indicates that the procedures offered under the old rule were not 
sufficient. 
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This Court has not held that attorney discipline cases are subject to lower scrutiny 
or less-precise adjudication and review. To the contrary, in Nemelka v. Ethics and 
Discipline Comm., 2009 UT 33, 212 P.3d 525, this Court held that "the seriousness of 
alleged violations of a lawyer's professional responsibility requires that a lawyer be 
afforded an opportunity to defend his or her good professional standing.'* Id. at ^ 18. It 
is important to note that in Nemelka, like here, the Court reviewed the propriety of 
informal proceedings which resulted in a public reprimand. 
The argument that 'low-level" sanctions are entitled to a less-detailed adjudication 
also fails to acknowledge the progressive nature of attorney discipline. Under Supreme 
Court Rule of Professional Practice 14-606(b), when a lawyer is sanctioned for 
"misconduct similar to that for which the lawyer has previously been disciplined, the 
appropriate sanction will generally be one level more severe than the sanction the lawyer 
previously received." Similarly, Rule 14-607 indicates that a prior record of discipline is 
an aggravating circumstance which "may justify an increase in the degree of discipline 
imposed." Because "relatively slight" discipline today has the ability to aggravate and 
increase sanctions in future cases, it is incorrect to assert that "low-level" decisions have 
no effect upon a respondent's ability to practice law and therefore are not entitled to the 
same level of detail and precision as more "serious" matters. See Committee Brief, p. 21. 
B. Decisions Requiring Detailed Findings by Courts and Administrative 
Agencies Apply in the Attorney Discipline Context. 
The Committee next argues that cases concerning the sufficiency of a district court 
or administrative agency's findings of fact are misplaced, and that Long imposes a "false 
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burden" on the Screening Panel by comparing it to a district court. See Committee Brief, 
p. 18. 
This Court has long held that factual findings in attorney discipline cases are 
treated "much the same as findings of administrative agencies." In re Schwenke, 849 
P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1993); see also In re Colder, 795 P.2d 656, 657 (Utah 1990) ("[W]e 
treat factual findings by fact-finding entities within the Bar much the same as we treat 
such findings from administrative agencies."). Administrative agencies are clearly tasked 
with stating the basis of their decisions with detail. See Milne Truck Lines v. Public 
Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986) ("It is also essential that the 
[agency] make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual 
issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a 
logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. . . ."); LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of 
Envtl Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("An administrative agency 
must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to 
permit meaningful appellate review."). As this Court explained in Milne Truck Lines: 
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is 
essential to a proper determination by an administrative agency. To that 
end, findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed law and fact, are 
reached. Without such findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of 
reviewing the Commission's order in accordance with established legal 
principles and of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and 
capricious administrative action. 
Milne Truck Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378. 
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The Committee has cited no case law in support of its argument that attorney 
disciplinary matters do not require detailed factual findings. In contrast, Utah appellate 
courts have "emphasized that an administrative agency must make findings of fact that 
are sufficiently detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review." Lucas v. Murray 
City Civil Serv. Commn, 949 P.2d 746, 763 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In sum, informal 
disciplinary matters are just as deserving of the Committee's full attention, complete with 
the "detail and precision" apparently only afforded to more "serious" matters. 
C. The Rules Governing the State Bar Require More Detailed Findings of 
Fact. 
The Committee's central argument—that the Screening Panel should not be 
burdened with explaining its decision—has an additional fatal flaw: it fails to account for 
the explicit requirements of Supreme Court Rule of Professional Practice 14-510. 
Notwithstanding allowance for informal proceedings, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
stated by rule that a screening panel recommendation "shall state the substance and 
nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the basis upon which the screening 
panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should be 
admonished or publicly reprimanded." Rule 14-510(b)(7) (formerly 14-510(b)(5)(D) and 
(E)). 
It does not matter whether the Committee believes informal disciplinary 
proceedings are serious enough to merit the level of detail and precision afforded other 
judicial proceedings. This Court has directed that Screening Panels must explain "the 
basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
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that the respondent should be admonished or publicly reprimanded." In the present case, 
the Screening Panel failed to adequately follow this rule. For example, finding as a 
matter of fact in the Henriod Recommendation that "Mr. Long charged excessive fees for 
the work he completed in the Vantreese matter and the Perez Hernandez matter," and 
then concluding as a matter of law that "By charging excessive fees for work he 
performed in two cases, Mr. Long violated Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)," simply does not "state the 
basis" of the Screening Panel's decision. See State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 464 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "merely recording] incomplete, conclusory statements in its 
findings of fact" is insufficient); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991 (holding that a trial court's findings of fact merely reflected the court's desire to 
arrive at the necessary conclusions of law; such findings are conclusory and insufficient 
because they "provide no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision 
and render effective appellate review unfeasible"). 
The rules and legal principles set forth by this Court send a clear message. 
Attorney discipline—even that dealing with a "mere" public reprimand—is a serious 
matter. Nemelka, 2009 UT 33, |^ 18. Adjudicatory bodies are required to explain the 
basis of their decisions by articulating sufficiently detailed findings of fact to disclose the 
steps by which they reach their conclusions. Milne Truck Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378. This 
Court must be able to review whether the Screening Panel's recommendation has a sound 
foundation, and whether OPC met its burden of establishing a violation of the Rules "by a 
preponderance of the evidence." See Rule 14-510 (b)(7) (formerly 14-510(b)(5)(D) and 
(E)). Failure by the Screening Panel to explain the basis of its decision interferes with 
6 
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Long's ability to obtain meaningful review of his case, and requires that sanctions in this 
matter be vacated. See Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477 ("Absent adequate findings of fact, 
meaningful review of a decision's evidentiary basis is virtually impossible.").2 
II. Long Fulfilled His Duty to Marshal the Evidence. 
Under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Respondent Ethics and 
Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court (the "Committee") argues first that 
Petitioner Larry N. Long failed to adequately marshal all record evidence in favor of the 
challenged findings, and as such may not obtain review before this Court of the 
sufficiency of the evidence below. In so arguing, the Committee fails to acknowledge the 
dependent relationship between the marshaling requirement and the adequacy of findings 
of fact below, understates efforts by Long to marshal the evidence, and overstates the 
evidence against Long which may be found in the record. 
The system for imposing attorney discipline does not appear to have functioned 
properly in this case, perhaps reflecting a greater systemic breakdown which has been 
acknowledged by the Bar Commission. In the May/June issue of the Utah Bar Journal, 
Bar President Stephen W. Owens indicated that the Bar Commission recently completed 
an exhaustive internal review of the Bar's internal operations, including administration of 
attorney discipline. Among the recommendations adopted by the Commission is the 
following: 
3. Provide better training to screening panel members of the Supreme 
Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee about their role in the disciplinary 
process, including clarification of their relationship with OPC, the burden 
of proof that must be met by OPC, witness cross examination, and no 
presumption in favor of accepting the recommendations of OPC. 
Stephen W. Owens, The Dreaded Letter from OPC, UTAH BAR JOURNAL, May/June 
2010, at 8-9. The present matter illustrates the timeliness and prudence of the foregoing 
recommendation. 
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A. The Obligation to Marshal Evidence In Support of the Challenged 
Findings Is Dependent Upon the Existence of Adequate Findings. 
The marshaling requirement obligates an appellant to marshal all record evidence 
"that supports a challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). This obligation applies 
when attempting to "demonstrate that the factual findings made by the trial court were 
erroneous." Save Our Sck v. Bd. ofEduc. of Salt Lake City, 2005 UT 55, ^ 10, 122 P.3d 
611 (emphasis added). It is important to distinguish that the marshaling requirement 
applies only when challenging the substantive basis of findings of fact. It is not 
necessary to marshal evidence to challenge factual findings that are "inadequate as a 
matter of law." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 2007 UT 42, ^ 16 n.2, 164 P.3d 384. 
As was discussed in Part I of the Brief of Appellant (hereinafter "Long Brief) and 
in Part I of this brief, the Screening Panel's findings of fact in each matter were deficient. 
The Screening Panel failed to state the facts upon which it based its determination that 
Long violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, articulated no specific facts and cited 
no specific evidence from the record to support its conclusions, and failed to make and 
articulate findings of fact with regard to each element of the alleged offenses. Indeed, 
most of the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact are stated not as facts supporting a 
conclusion, but as conclusions themselves. 
This Court has agreed that marshaling of the evidence is not required where 
"'findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual 
675 :428614vl 
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determinations/" Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ^ 13 (quoting Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477). 
The Utah Court of Appeals explained in Woodward: 
[Appellant's] marshaling effort was largely ineffectual by reason of the 
conclusory nature of the trial court's findings of fact. 'The process of 
marshaling the evidence serves the important function of reminding 
litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder 
at trial." However, we will only grant this deference when the findings of 
fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's 
decision. 
Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477 (quoting State v. Moore} 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)) (internal citation omitted). The court explained further: 
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence 
when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully 
challenged as factual determinations. In other words, the way to attack 
findings which appear to be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is 
to marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate the evidence is 
inadequate to sustain such findings. But where the findings are not of that 
caliber, appellant need not go through a futile marshaling exercise." 
Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477-478. Similar circumstances are present here. See also 
Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, % 10, 984 P.2d 392 (relieving appellant of his 
burden to marshal evidence because the trial court's findings were inadequate and 
conclusory); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
("[AJppellants need not engage in a futile marshalling exercise if they can demonstrate 
the findings, as framed by the court, are legally insufficient."). 
In sum, "[i]f the findings are legally inadequate the exercise of marshalling the 
evidence in support of the findings becomes futile and the appellant is under no 
obligation to marshal." Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding that a trial court may not merely draw a conclusion; it must "articulate the basic 
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facts it found and the logical steps it used" to reach its conclusion). In the present case, 
the findings of fact in each matter are inadequate. They fail, on the whole, to explain the 
basis of the Panel's recommendation. The marshaling requirement demands that an 
appellant present the evidence which would support the challenged findings of fact. It 
does not require that an appellant speculate as to what findings of fact could conceivably 
have been made and then search out evidence to support them. 
B. The Record Lacks Substantial Evidence to Support the Screening 
Panel's Recommendations. 
The Committee mischaracterizes Long's attempt to marshal evidence where it 
claims that Long only included facts which favor his position. See Committee Brief, p. 
12. Long offered numerous "unfavorable" facts. See, e.g., Long Brief, Statement of 
Facts, T| 3 (recounting Shepard's testimony that he had not retained Long), ^f 13-15 
(indicating that Long missed hearings and Scheeler said he would handle the matter 
himself), |^ 20 (indicating that Scheeler offered to "appear" in court on behalf of a client), 
U 21 (indicating that Long discovered Scheeler conducting an unauthorized mediation), ^ 
26 (expressing Judge Henroid's opinion that Long has overcharged clients for 
insubstantial work). If Long failed to adequately connect these facts to the ultimate 
For reasons not relevant to its holding, the Court of Appeals noted that custody 
proceedings require particular attention to factual findings. Barnes, 857 P.2d at 259 
("Specificity of findings is particularly important in custody determinations. This is so 
because the issues involved are highly fact sensitive."). The Committee appears to 
acknowledge a similar need in the present case. See Committee Brief, p. 12 (stating that 
"the issues in this case present questions which are extremely fact-dependent"). 
4
 In addition, it is important to note that this argument is not made for the first time on 
Reply. For example, while discussing substantial evidence, Long indicated in his Brief 
that he is "only able to venture a guess as to the Screening Panel's actual analysis." Long 
Brief, p. 32. 
10 
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conclusions reached by the Screening Panel, it is only because the Screening Panel failed 
to provide the required structure whereby this would be accomplished. Without adequate 
findings of fact, it is impossible for an appellant to marshal all record evidence "that 
supports a challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The marshaling requirement 
does not apply to ultimate conclusions of law. See Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^ 17 n.4, 
994 P.2d 193 ("[T]he trial court's determination . . . is a conclusion of law, and the 
marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions 
of law."). 
The Committee specifically alleged inadequate marshaling with respect to the 
Nelson and Shepard cases, and argues that sufficient evidence exists to support the 
recommendation in all three cases. In response to the Committee's arguments, the 
marshaling and sufficiency of the evidence with respect to each matter is addressed in 
turn. 
1. Shepard Complaint: 
Addressing the Shepard matter, Long specifically takes issue in his brief with the 
Screening Panel's conclusory determination that "Mr. Long charged an unreasonable fee 
for services rendered." See Long Brief, pp. 29-30 (quoting Shepard Finding of Fact, |^ 9). 
Long argues that although ample evidence of Long's fees and activities is found in the 
record, there is no evidence indicating what would constitute an "excessive" fee or 
suggesting that Long's fees exceed customary charges in the area for similar cases or 
otherwise violate Rule 1.5(a). In addition, Long notes that this "finding" is a perfect 
example of a "mechanical conclusion," wholly lacking any specific factual findings as to 
11 
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the necessary elements of the charged violation. See Clements v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 893 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Long likewise argues that he had a 
legitimate basis upon which to bring a claim, whether in quantum meruit or based upon 
the signed retainer agreement; therefore, it cannot be said that the collection case was 
meritless. 
The Committee finds fault with Long's marshaling of the evidence because Long 
did not cite a statement he made at the Screening Panel hearing agreeing that he did not 
think he'd performed enough work to earn the entire flat fee. Also, the Committee 
complains that Long did not recount details of his offer to settle the fee dispute with 
Shepard for $1,500. These facts, the Committee argues, support the Screening Panels' 
findings that Long's fee was unreasonable and that he filed an unmeritorious claim. 
Notably, none of the findings of fact in the Shepard matter concern Long's statement at 
the hearing or subsequent attempts to settle the dispute with Shepard. 
By the Committee's argument, an attorney would be subject to sanction for 
violation of Rule 3.1 any time a complaint is drafted that alleges greater damages than are 
ultimately found to be warranted. Moreover, a claim asserted by an attorney may not be 
considered unmeritorious simply because the attorney ultimately settles or dismisses a 
case. The only evidence in the record shows that Long had a basis upon which to assert a 
claim against Shepard. Evidence of Long's attempt to settle the case need not have been 
marshaled as it is not evidence of the propriety of the fee or the merit of the claim. 
Moreover, none of the Screening Panel's findings of fact concern settlement efforts. 
675 :428614vl 
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Long recounted in his brief the nature and extent of work performed in the 
Shepard matter. See Long Brief, Statement of Facts, ^ 2, 6-7. Long likewise stated the 
basis of his claim for compensation from Shepard, recounted that Shepard believed he 
had not hired Long, and indicated that he ultimately withdrew the collection suit. See 
Long Brief, Statement of Facts, ffl] 3, 8. These facts were recounted without exaggeration 
in favor of or against Long's position. They are the extent of relevant evidence on the 
question of whether Long charged an unreasonable fee or filed an unmeritorious claim. 
2. Nelson Complaint: 
In an attempt to demonstrate how Long should have marshaled the evidence in the 
Nelson matter, the Committee actually demonstrates the impossibility of doing so. The 
Committee begins by citing facts from the record which the Committee claims support 
certain factual determinations. Unfortunately, the Screening Panel did not make the 
factual determinations the Committee attempts to support. 
For example, the Committee claims its facts "demonstrate^ that Long knew that 
his office was in some respect representing Merritt before his own fee agreement 
indicates the representation began." See Committee Brief, p. 14. The Screening Panel 
made no such finding of fact, see Nelson Recommendation, and Long additionally 
disputes that the evidence cited would support such a finding. The Committee next states 
that "Long's letter to Nielsen [sic] establishes that Long was aware of Scheeler's 
'mediation' and efforts to agree on a settlement and division of property. . . ." See 
Committee Brief, p. 15. Again, the Screening Panel made no such finding of fact and 
Long additionally disputes that the evidence cited would support such a finding. Next, 
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the Committee indicates that "Long knew Scheeler negotiated a property division and/or 
prepared the Settlement Agreement as of June 2007, but Scheeler remained employed by 
Long until he quit in November 2007." See Committee Brief, p. 15. Again, the 
Screening Panel made no such finding of fact concerning Long's knowledge or 
Scheeler's employment. See Nelson Recommendation. Lastly, the Committee states that 
"Scheeler's conduct was improper, and . . . Long not only knew of such conduct, but 
attempted to rely upon it for his client's benefit in the protective order violation 
proceeding." See Committee Brief, p. 15. Again, the Screening Panel made no such 
finding of fact, and Long disputes that the evidence cited would support such a finding.5 
The only findings made by the Screening Panel which Long challenges are as 
follows: 
7. Mr. Nelson was led to believe that Mr. Scheeler was an attorney. 
8. At Mr. Merritt's second court hearing, Mr. Scheeler appeared to 
"represent David" and tried to negotiate with the opposing party. 
12. Mr. Long allowed Mr. Scheeler to appear in court, contact opposing 
party [sic] and conduct mediation proceedings at Mr. Long's office. 
See Nelson Recommendation, pp. 2-3; Long Brief, pp. 31-32, 41-45. The remaining 
findings are either not disputed or not proper findings at all. See supra Part I; Long Brief, 
Part I (discussing the insufficiency of conclusory findings which "provide no insight into 
5
 In addition, Long notes that much of the evidence "marshaled" by the Committee would 
not require a conclusion that Rule 5.3(a) or Rule 5.5(a) were violated. A non-lawyer may 
conduct a mediation. See Supreme Court Rule of Professional Practice 14-802(c). In 
addition, Rule 5.3(c) indicates that it is improper for a lawyer to ratify conduct which 
would violate the Rules "if engaged in by a lawyer." Utah R. Profl Cond. 5.3(c). It 
follows, then, that if a lawyer could properly perform the conduct complained of, 
ratification would not automatically result in a violation of Rule 5.3. 
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the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision and render effective appellate review 
unfeasible"). 
As was stated in Long's opening brief, there is no evidence in the record that 
Nelson was led to believe that Scheeler was an attorney. There is no evidence in the 
record that Scheeler ever appeared in court on Merrit's behalf. There is no evidence in 
the record that Long "allowed" Scheeler to conduct mediation proceedings at Long's 
office or that Long knew of Scheeler's mediation before it was conducted. "If there 
simply is no supportive evidence, counsel need only say so and the challenge will be 
well-taken—counsel is not expected to marshal the nonexistent." Kimball v. Kimball, 
2009 UT App 233, ^ 20 n.55 217 P.3d 733. Long offered evidence concerning the 
disputed findings, including evidence unsupportive to Long's position. See Long Brief, 
Statement of Facts, ffl| 14, 19-22. Long adequately marshaled the evidence with respect 
to the Nelson matter. 
3. Henroid Complaint: 
The Committee did not specifically challenge whether Long adequately marshaled 
the evidence with respect to the Henroid matter. As the Screening Panel failed to make 
any legitimate findings of fact in the Henroid matter regarding Rule 1.5(a), it was 
sufficient for Long to simply present all facts concerning the work performed and amount 
charged to each client, including Judge Henroid's opinion that Long's charges were 
excessive. See Long Brief, Statement of Facts, ffl| 26-34. 
6
 The only evidence that could be remotely construed as supporting a finding that 
Scheeler "appeared" in court on Merrit's behalf is restated in Paragraph 20 of the 
Statement of Facts in Long's Brief of Appellant. 
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Responding to Long's contention that no one but Long presented evidence 
respecting the Henroid matters, the Committee argues that it was not necessary for 
additional evidence to be presented because "the Panel had the court dockets, which 
reflected the few appearances Long made for each client, the fee agreements, and Long's 
recounting of the work he performed" which the Committee concludes was not credible. 
See Committee Brief, p. 25. The Committee also had the letter from Judge Henroid 
which initiated the OPC inquiry. Id. 
Whether a fee is reasonable depends in part upon the entire body of work 
performed by the attorney. What neither the Committee nor the Screening Panel explains 
is how the Screening Panel was able to conclude from a court docket and a letler from a 
judge that Long did not perform sufficient work to earn his fee. Neither the docket nor 
the letter are competent evidence of work performed outside the courtroom. If the 
Screening Panel doubted the credibility of Long's account, the Panel must nonetheless 
base its decision on evidence to the contrary. There is simply no evidence in the record 
that Long did not perform work outside the courtroom which would justify his fee. 
Notably, the Committee is unable to cite any such evidence in its brief. 
C. Any Failure to Marshal Should Not Result in Dismissal. 
Even if the Court concludes that Long failed to adequately meet the marshaling 
requirement, the Court should nevertheless make an independent review of the evidence 
in this case. This Court has held that even in the absence of marshaling, "[t]he reviewing 
n 
We do not actually know if the Screening Panel doubted the credibility of Long's 
account. There are no findings of fact which indicate what evidence the Screening Panel 
believed or which otherwise explain the basis of the Screening Panel's recommendation. 
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court . . . retains discretion to consider independently the whole record and determine if 
the decision below has adequate factual support." Martinez, 2007 UT 42. ^ 19-20, 
(internal citations omitted). 
Matters of attorney discipline are original proceedings before this Court. In re 
Anderson, 2004 UT 7, ^ 46, 82 P.3d 1334. The Committee acts under a delegation of 
authority, and matters eventually before the Court come as confirmation or rejection of 
actions taken by the Court's delegees. Id. "In reviewing cases involving attorney 
discipline, we . . . 'reserve the right to draw different inferences from the facts than those 
drawn by the trial court.'" In re Discipline of Crawley, 2007 UT 44, U 17, 164 P.3d 1232 
(quoting In re Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998)). Due to the unique 
nature of attorney discipline, an independent review of the record may be particularly 
appropriate even if the Court concludes that the evidence has been inadequately 
marshaled. 
III. The Screening Panel Misinterpreted and Misapplied the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Erroneously Finding Violations of Rules 1.5 (a), 3.1, 5.3(a), and 
5.5(a). 
A. Rule 1.5(a): 
Rule 1.5(a) prohibits making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an 
unreasonable fee. With regard to the Shepard matter, the Committee does not appear to 
argue that the flat fee initially agreed upon by Long and Shepard was anything but 
reasonable. Nor does the Committee contend that the $100 actually collected by Long 
was unreasonable. The Committee's argument centers around whether it was 
675 :428614vl 
17 
unreasonable for Long, after the representation was prematurely terminated, to file a 
collection action for the full amount of the agreed-upon fee. 
Admittedly, a $6,600 charge for six hours of work appears excessive after-the-fact. 
However, Long and Shepard entered into a flat fee agreement. A flat fee agreement, by 
its nature, represents a certain amount of risk sharing between the attorney and client. 
There is always a chance that the engagement will terminate quickly, in which case the 
attorney will receive an unexpectedly high fee for the amount of effort expended. Other 
times, the engagement may run longer than anticipated, in which case the client will pay 
an unexpectedly low fee for the amount of effort expended. As the Supreme Court of 
Arizona explained: 
A non-refundable flat fee reflects "a negotiated element of risk sharing 
between attorney and client" whereby the "attorney takes the risk that she 
will do more work than planned, without additional compensation; and the 
client, in return, agrees that the attorney will earn the agreed-upon amount, 
even if that amount would exceed the attorney's usual hourly rate. . . ." 
Because a non-refundable flat fee reflects a balancing of the risk to both 
client and lawyer, a flat fee can be larger than the fee generated by hourly 
rates without being excessive. 
In re Connelly, 55 P.3d 756, 761-762 (Ariz. 2002) (quoting In the Matter ofSwartz, 686 
P.2d 1236, 1242-43 (Ariz. 1984)) 
There is no indication that the flat fee in the Shepard matter was unreasonable at 
the time the parties entered into the agreement, based on their mutual expectation of the 
services to be rendered. Ultimately, the fee received by Long was not unreasonable for 
the work performed. In the interim, a support staff employee in Long's office caused the 
fee agreement and promissory note to be sent to Express Recovery for collection. See 
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Shepard R. 000213-16. The collection agency alleged the full contract amount in a 
pleading, as the contract was the only information they were provided by Long's office. 
However, as soon as it was brought to Long's attention that this particular collection 
action had been filed, Long agreed that Express Recovery should attempt to settle the 
matter for $1,500—a reasonable fee for six hours of work. Ultimately, Long directed that 
the lawsuit be withdrawn. Beyond the initial allegation in the pleading which was made 
without Long's knowledge or direction, the evidence does not show that Long 
affirmatively attempted to collect from Shepard an amount to which he had no reasonable 
claim. 
Addressing the Henroid matter, the Committee again makes the naked claim that 
"[t]he Panel found that the fees were excessive based upon substantial evidence." 
Committee Brief, p. 27. As discussed above, no evidence was cited by the Screening 
Panel in its recommendation. To date, the Committee has also failed to cite evidence 
which shows that Long performed insufficient work to justify his fee, or that the fee was 
otherwise unreasonable. No such evidence is found in the record. 
B. Rule 3.1: 
Rule 3.1 prohibits bringing or defending a claim "unless there is a basis in law and 
fact for doing so that is not frivolous." Utah R. Prof 1 Cond. 3.1. The Committee claims 
that the action by Express Recovery against Shepard violated Rule 3.1 because Long was 
not entitled to the full amount sought, later attempted to settle the case for less than the 
amount sought, and ultimately directed Express Recovery to withdraw the suit. 
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As discussed above, an attempt to settle a suit or a decision to withdraw a claim is 
not an admission that the claim was without merit. Moreover, a lawyer should not be 
sanctioned for alleging damages which are greater than may ultimately be awarded, 
especially when the damages figure alleged is based on a written contract. Shepard 
signed a flat fee retainer agreement and a promissory note. A collection suit was filed 
based on the express terms of the agreement and note. It cannot be said that the claim 
was frivolous or had no basis in law or fact. See State v. Romano, 507 P.2d 1025. 1025 
(Utah 1973) ("'Frivolous' is synonymous with 'having no basis in law or fact.'"). 
C. Rule 5.3(a): 
Rule 5.3(a) requires a supervising lawyer to "make reasonable efforts to ensure 
that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct 
is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer." Comment 1 to Rule 5.3 
states that a lawyer must give assistants "appropriate instruction and supervision." The 
Committee acknowledges that at the time Scheeler was hired, "Long took measures to 
ensure that Scheeler's conduct would be compatible with Long's ethical obligations." 
See Committee Brief, p. 28. The Committee then argues that Long should have 
subsequently done a better job of investigating and monitoring Scheeler's activities.8 In 
addition, the Committee again takes issue with Long's "reliance" upon Scheeler's 
conduct, arguing that it was improper for Long to use the settlement agreement prepared 
by Scheeler following the mediation. 
o 
We do not know if the Screening Panel had a similar basis for their recommendation, as 
their Findings of Fact do not address this. 
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Long disputes whether Scheeler violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by 
conducting a mediation and drafting a settlement agreement which memorialized the 
results of the mediation. See infra Part 1II.D. Rule 14-802(c) indicates that a non-lawyer 
may represent a party in a mediation or serve as a mediator. There is also no prohibition 
against a non-lawyer drafting a settlement document which memorializes an agreement 
reached during mediation. Likewise, the evidence does not support the Screening 
Panel's finding that Scheeler "appeared" in court on behalf of a client. See supra Part 
II.B.2; Long Brief, Part IILD. 
As discussed in Part ILB.2 above, even if Scheeler did engage in the unauthorized 
practice of law, reliance upon Scheeler's improper conduct does not necessarily amount 
to a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 5.3 indicates that a lawyer may 
be disciplined for ratifying improper conduct "that would be a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer." Utah R. Prof 1 Cond. 5.3(c). The 
conduct complained of (conducting a mediation and drafting a settlement agreement) 
would clearly not be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a 
lawyer. Thus, it is not improper for Long to have ratified or relied upon the conduct in 
question. 
The Committee states that Long "failed to take any steps to correct what he knew 
was Scheeler's ongoing improper conduct." Committee Brief, p. 29. The Committee 
Utah R. Prof 1 Cond. 2.4(c) does not state that only a lawyer may draft documents 
memorializing the results of a mediation. It would be an odd circumstance if two non-
lawyers properly came together representing parties in a mediation conducted by non-
lawyer, but then the parties were unable to memorialize their agreement in writing 
because no lawyer was present to draft the document. 
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indicates that because Long knew Scheeler was engaging in improper conduct. Rule 5.3 
was violated. This assertion misstates the facts and the Screening Panel's findings. Even 
if Scheeler engaged in improper conduct that amounted to the unauthorized practice of 
law, there is no evidence in the record that Long knew Scheeler was engaging in the 
improper conduct and failed to take corrective action. None of the Screening Panel's 
findings of fact state that Long knew Scheeler was engaging in improper conduct. To the 
contrary, the evidence shows that Long put in place measures to reasonably assure 
Scheeler's compliance with the Rules. Scheeler failed to follow those measures. 
Ultimately, the employment relationship was terminated. See People v. Smith, 74 P.3d 
566, 571 (Colo. 2003) ("The evidence presented, however, revealed that Smith did have 
measures in place to reasonably assure that . . . Ross would conduct herself in such a 
manner as was compatible with his professional responsibilities. Ross didn't follow 
those measures. Since such measures were in place, the charged violation of Colo. RPC 
5.3(a) is dismissed."). 
D. Rule 5.5(a): 
Rule 5.5(a) directs that a lawyer may not engage in, or assist another in engaging 
in, the unauthorized practice of law. As discussed above addressing Rule 5.3, Long 
10
 The Committee attempts to make an issue of whether Long terminated Scheeler, or 
Scheeler quit. See Committee Brief, p. 29. The record is clear that the employment 
relationship terminated when it was determined that Scheeler was unwilling to conduct 
himself in compliance with the terms of his employment agreement, which required strict 
adherence with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Though not in the evidentiary record, 
Long notes that Scheeler is presently suing Long for wrongful termination. See Scheeler 
v. L. Long Lawyer, Inc., Case No. 080908169, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. The Court may take judicial notice of such matters. Utah R. Evid. 201. 
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disputes whether the activities Scheeler allegedly engaged in amount to the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
The Committee takes particular issue with Scheeler drafting a settlement 
agreement which memorialized an agreement reached at mediation. The Committee 
states that Long knew Scheeler was drafting the settlement agreement, which the 
Committee defines as the unauthorized practice of law. While it would appear the Long 
became aware of the settlement agreement after-the-fact, there is no evidence that Long 
knew of or assisted Scheeler in actually drafting the settlement agreement, and no such 
finding was made by the Screening Panel. Moreover, if Long had directed Scheeler to 
draft the agreement, it would not be the unauthorized practice of law for Scheeler to do so 
as he would be acting under the direction of a licensed attorney. In sum, the Committee 
misapplies Rule 5.5(a). A lawyer may not "assist" with activities he is unaware of. 
IV. Disciplinary Recommendations for Violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) Should 
Be Reduced. 
In two of the three matters before the Court, Long was held to have violated Rule 
7.1 and Rule 7.5(d) because his firm was sometimes referred to as "L. Long Lawyer, 
Inc.," and at other times referred to as "L. Long Lawyers, Inc." At all times relevant, 
only one lawyer was employed at the firm. 
Under Rule 14-610, the distinction between circumstances justifying an 
admonition and a public reprimand is either "caus[ing] injury" or "misconduct that 
involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law." See Rule 14-605(c) and (d). Here, the Screening Panel 
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entirely failed to explain the basis of its recommendation of discipline. No findings of 
fact address the issue of harm or whether Long acted deceitfully in a way that adversely 
reflects on his fitness to practice law. No findings indicate why the Screening Panel 
recommended an admonition on one case and a public reprimand in others. 
This Court reviews recommendations of discipline de novo. In re Doncouse, 2004 
UT 77, T| 10, 99 P.3d 837 ("It is our duty to make an independent determination as to the 
appropriate sanction to be imposed."). The circumstances of the violations of Rule 7.1 
and Rule 7.5(d) do not justify a public reprimand as no evidence exists that any member 
of the public was actually harmed or that Long intended to deceive by inclusion of the 
inadvertent "s" on his firm's letterhead. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter is before the Court because the system for imposing attorney 
discipline has not functioned properly. In each matter, the Screening Panel largely 
accepted OPC's recommendations for discipline without making proper findings of fact 
regarding the necessary elements of each violation charged and without explaining the 
basis of its recommendation. Committee Chair Bruce Maak then reviewed the Screening 
Panel's recommendations acknowledging that its findings are deficient. However, the 
Chair then concluded that the Screening Panel based its decision on evidence or at least 
did not believe Long. On appeal, the Committee argues that the Screening Panel's 
recommendations should be sustained, notwithstanding its deficiencies, because the 
Court should defer to the Screening Panel findings. The Screening Panel, it is argued, 
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should not be required to explain its decision because this level of "detail and precision"" 
is not contemplated in informal proceedings. 
The Screening Panel's failed to state "the basis upon which [it] has concluded, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should be admonished or publicly 
reprimanded.** See Supreme Court Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7) (formerly 
14-510(b)(5)(D) and (E)). This failure should not be excused. Accordingly, the Order of 
Discipline for each matter should be vacated. Long should be admonished or issued a 
letter of caution regarding his inadvertent violations of Rule 7.1 and Rule 7.5(d), and the 
Committee should be ordered to print a retraction in the Utah Bar Journal regarding 
sanctions imposed against Long. 
DATED this ^> day of June, 2010. 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow 
Alex B. Leeman 
Attorneys for Petitioner Larry TV. Long 
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